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Abstract
Affective polarization is on the rise, which makes understanding the origins of
it increasingly important. Some work finds that partisan sorting is associated with
increased polarization, due to a lack of exposure to conflicting opinions as well as the
ease of making generalizations about the opposing side (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky,
Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019). Individuals with more closely aligned ideological and
partisan identities are more likely to exhibit hostility towards the other party, and react
more emotionally to information that threatens their party or issue stance (Mason,
2015). The aim of this paper is to analyze how contextual factors, specifically the
partisan distribution of an area, can influence affective polarization. Building off of the
loss aversion literature, I theorize that individuals in the majority party are likely to
exhibit lower levels of out-party affect, and therefore greater affective polarization, than
individuals in the minority party. Using electoral returns from presidential elections
to proxy state party identity and American National Elections Studies data from
2008-2016, I find a modest, but statistically significant, association between party
status and affective polarization and out-party affect.
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Introduction
In general, Americans are more polarized today than they were 30 years ago (Abramowitz,

2010a). Affective polarization—the distance between how an individual feels about their own
party (in-party affect) and how they feel about the other party (out-party affect)—specifically,
is also on the rise (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). Moreover, recent work shows that affective
polarization shapes a plethora of political attitudes and behaviors, as well as non-political
behavior such as dating (Iyengar et al., 2019; J. Druckman, Klar, Kkrupnikov, Levendusky,
& Ryan, 2020; Garrett, Long, & Jeong, 2019). The root causes of affective polarization,
however, are still unclear.
The most widely accepted causes of affective polarization are individual level attributes
such as strength of partisanship and ideology (Iyengar et al., 2019). In addition, with the
advent of literature on negative partisanship (the notion that individuals more strongly
identify as being against their out-party rather than identifying with their in party), recent
evidence shows that affective polarization is largely linked with greater out-party animosity
(Abramowitz & Webster, 2016).1 However, the effect an individual’s political environment
has on their affective polarization warrants further study.

Following recent work that

considers how the political context an individual lives in influences their affective polarization
(Connors, 2020), I argue that an individual’s party being in the majority or minority of their
own political context can influence their out-party attitudes. The specific mechanism by
which I contend an individual’s party status may be linked with their affective

1

In-party affect has been relatively stable over time, with some work showing that it has increased slightly
due to increased partisan sorting (Levendusky, 2009; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018).

1

polarization stems from the psychological phenomenon of loss aversion.
In brief, prior work shows that individuals wish to advance the status of their party and
maintain the positive view that they have of the party (Huddy, 2001). Loss aversion theory
shows that individuals do not like to lose and will do what they can in order to prevent
themselves from losing (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011). The heightened awareness that is
associated with potential losses causes increased emotionality (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011).
Building off this literature, I argue that loss aversion will result in lower out-party affect
(and as a consequence affective polarization) for those in the majority party because of the
perception that the minority party is a threat to their party’s majority status, regardless of
how real that threat is.
In the remainder of this paper, I discuss the state of the current literature on the
origins of negative out-party affect and affective polarization. Next, I develop a theory
to demonstrate the impact that loss aversion can have on out-party animosity, and in turn
affective polarization. The following section will discuss the means with which I intend to
test my hypothesis. Using ANES data from 2008, 2012, and 2016, I am able to demonstrate
support for my main hypothesis that being in the majority party in a state is associated with
a decrease in out-party affect. The effect of majority party status, however, never reaches
the same effect size as more conventional causes of out-party animosity, namely ideological
strength and partisan strength. In order to account for loss aversion, I also analyze the
association between party status and out-party affect based on electoral competition. I
provide some evidence to show that the association between party status and out-party
affect may be mitigated by electoral competition, however the results are inconsistent. The
paper then concludes with a discussion of the implications of these results.

2
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The Origins of Out-party Animosity and Affective
Polarization
Prior work shows that out-party animus has been steadily increasing over the

last 30 years, with negative partisanship becoming a primary motivator of political
participation (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Klar & Krupnikov, 2016). Some work
finds that partisan sorting increases polarization, due to a lack of exposure to conflicting
opinions as well as the ease of making generalizations about the opposing side
(Iyengar et al., 2019).

The connection between sorting and increased affective

polarization is due to a lack of cross-cutting identities decreasing exposure to other
groups, which then in turn dehumanizes the out-party (Mason, 2015, 2018). This
lack of cross-cutting identities has made it easier for individuals to create broad,
negative generalizations about the out-party, which increases affective polarization.
There is also evidence that decreasing exposure to the other side and increasing the
presence of like-minded voices increases affective polarization (Gimpel & Hui, 2015).
Recent work also finds that those with more closely aligned ideological and
partisan identities are more likely to exhibit hostility towards the other party, and
react more emotionally to information that threatens their party or issue stance
(Mason, 2015). Affective polarization can be as ingrained in us as our personalities,
as other work shows (Webster, 2018). Even when accounting for personality, however,
the strength of ideological and partisan identities are essential to the development of
negative affect towards the out-party. Attachment to groups, such as racial groups,
are also linked with attitudes towards the out-party (Mason & Wronski, 2018).

3

These group attachments are all formed and reinforced in an individual’s political context
(Conover, 1984).
The relationship between place and politics is well studied. Group attitudes are activated
by their political environment, as some group identities are more salient in certain political
environments (Conover, 1984). Group identities are activated by the political environment
and they also are associated with affective polarization (Conover, 1984; Mason, 2015).
Furthermore, a more affectively polarized political context can increase an individual’s
affective polarization (Connors, 2020). If, as other work shows, information that is threatening
to their party will make individuals react more emotionally (Huddy, 2001; Mason, 2015),
then it is likely that information about the area that they live in will also cause them to
act emotionally, in turn causing them to have higher levels of affective polarization if that
information poses a threat to their party’s status (Huddy, 2001).
The main contribution of this paper is demonstrating that geographic context can influence
affective polarization as it does with other political attitudes. The attribute of geographic
context that I argue will influence affective polarization is the partisan distribution of the area
in which an individual lives — in this paper, their state. As I expand on below, individuals
respond negatively to threats to the party’s status. This desire to defend their party, and in
turn the impact that a state’s partisan distribution can have on affective polarization, are
rooted in social identity, and loss aversion.

4
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Loss Aversion
The core foundation of the psychological concept of loss aversion is that people

hate losing. Individuals will do what they can in order to avoid losing in any
circumstance (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Brenner, Rottenstreich, Sood, & Bilgin,
2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). The negative emotions from loss or potential
losses are stronger than the positive emotions from winning or potentially winning.
Furthermore, the effect of losing on negative emotions is significantly stronger than
the effect of winning on positive ones (Hochman & Yechiam, 2011; Köbberling &
Wakker, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1971). In other words, “losses loom
larger than gains,” (Brenner et al., 2007).2
There are two types of losses that are considered in the loss aversion literature:
valence losses and possession losses (Brenner et al., 2007). Valence losses/gains relate
to how (un)attractive the item is to the individual, while possession losses/gains
relate to the benefits associated with the loss/gain. Work shows evidence of the
existence of both valence loss aversion (Ahluwalia, 2002; Taylor, 1991) and possession
loss aversion (Carmon & Ariely, 2000; Brenner et al., 2007) in the marketplace;
although not all work distinguishes between the two (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman
1991; Hochman and Yechiam 2011).

3.1

Loss Aversion and Party Status

2

The degree to which losses are overweighted has been called into question, but the overall notion
that losses weigh heavier than gains has maintained support (Yechiam, 2019). Losses have been
shown to improve cognitive performance due to the increased weight of losses on an individual’s
actions (Yechiam & Hochman, 2014).

5

Within the context of this paper, the main focus is on valence loss aversion. Party status
is not a tangible gain; there is not a specific possession to lose in a decrease in the party’s
status. In the US, individuals are not really thinking in terms of economic gain when thinking
about party status (Kinder & Kiewiet 1981; but see Gerber & Huber 2009), and are more
concerned with protection from threats to the party’s prestige (Huddy, 2001). Generally
speaking, there is little possessive loss to be experienced in a change in party status. The
value in an individual’s party maintaining its status is valence. Because of this, valence loss
aversion is the main mechanism when addressing threats to party status. While evidence
shows that possessive loss aversion has a stronger impact on behavior and decision making,
valence loss aversion is still an important aspect of the decision making process (Brenner et
al., 2007).
For the remainder of the paper, party status is discussed in terms of majority and minority
status. This does not directly mean electoral outcomes, rather it is if the majority (or
minority) of people identify with their party in their state. For the individuals in the minority,
there is not any threat that can change their party’s status. Those in the majority, however,
have something to lose and a group to blame for that potential loss. For example, their
status as the majority party can be changed, therefore the minority party will be perceived
as a threat. (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Gerber & Huber, 2009)
While work shows that the immediate happiness of the minority party is more strongly
affected than the majority party following an election, this work does not directly analyze
individuals’ views of the other party (Pierce, Rogers, & Snyder, 2016). Individuals know that
losing will impact their happiness and will work to prevent their losses wherever possible,
and dislike whatever potential causes of their loss there are. Individuals who realize they
are in the majority are going to be more focused on avoiding a loss than basking in their
victory.
People who are in the majority party do not want to lose their status. Loss aversion also
leads individuals to wanting to maintain the status quo, which in this case would be those

6

in the majority maintaining their status (Alesina & Passarelli, 2019). The only source of
their potential loss would be from the minority party, which is a potential cause of conflict
between those in the majority and those in the minority. This conflict between the majority
and minority parties will likely have a direct influence on those in the majority party’s levels
of affective polarization due to the perception that the minority party poses a threat. With
this threat to party status in mind, I propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Individuals in the majority party in an area will be more affectively polarized than
those in the minority party.
The main source of increasing affective polarization is an increase in out-party animosity,
not so much an increase in affect towards their own group (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018). As
individuals’ identities become more sorted, their disdain for other groups have become more
focused (Levendusky, 2009). Individuals also perceive the out-party as further away from
themselves ideologically than they are in reality, which increases negative affective ratings
towards the out-party (Enders & Armaly, 2019). Due to this, I propose the following second
hypothesis:
H1a: The difference in affective polarization between the majority and minority parties will
be driven by differences in out-party affect.

3.2

Loss Aversion, Party Status, and Electoral Competition

Neither of the above hypotheses directly account for loss aversion. Electoral competition
is one potential way to account for this.

I have two competing expectations for how

competition can mitigate the relationship between party status and both affective polarization
and out-party affect. First, competition could impact how real of a threat the minority party
poses. How real the threat is could directly influence how party status is associated with
out-party affect and affective polarization. As such, I propose the following:

7

H2a: Individuals in the majority party who live in a more competitive area will have lower
levels of out-party affect, and higher affective polarization, due to loss aversion.
The inverse relationship could also be true, however. Individuals in the majority party
in an area that is not competitive also suffer a loss if their party loses the election in their
state. In addition, individuals in the majority party in a non-competitive context may be
more shocked by such a defeat, which may also contribute to an increase in negative emotions
towards the out-party. There is evidence to show that loss aversion is more of an affective
forecast (Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006). If individuals are thinking about
potential losses, then those in the majority may be more shocked by a potential loss if their
status is more secure. In accordance with this, I propose the following:
H2b: Individuals in the majority party who live in a less competitive area will have lower
out-party affect, and higher levels of affective polarization, due to loss aversion.
I contend that this association will exist independently of other known causes of out-party
animosity, such as ideological strength and strength of party identity — other work attempting
to find the causes of out-party animosity finds that ideological strength and strength of party
identity are consistently root causes, regardless of context (Webster, 2018).

8

4

Data and Research Design
In order to test my hypotheses, I first utilize the following models to analyze

whether party status is associated with affective polarization and out-party affect:

3

Af f ective P olarization = P artyStatus + Competition + P arty Status
∗ Competition + P ID Strength
+ Ideological Strength + Demographic Controls + 
(1)

Out-party Af f ect = P artyStatus + Competition + P arty Status
(2)
∗ Competition + P ID Strength
+ Ideological Strength + Demographic Controls + 
I use data from the American National Elections Studies in 2008, 2012, and
2016. Feeling thermometers are used to measure affect toward the parties. Feeling
thermometers were chosen due to their consistent inclusion on the ANES from year
to year. While other measures of feelings towards groups such as social distance
measures are utilized in some of the literature on affective polarization, feeling
thermometers are the most widely used and most direct measure (Iyengar et al.,
2019). Respondents in each year were asked to rate their feelings towards Democrats
or Republicans on a thermometer scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 representing
cold/negative feelings towards the groups and 100 representing warm/positive feelings
towards them. These feeling thermometers were then coded to reflect if they were
a respondent’s in-party or out-party based on a respondent’s partisanship. Affective
polarization is then measured as the difference between a respondent’s rating of their
3

Model 1 is used to test H1 and Model 2 is used to test H1a. Both are utilized to test H2a and
H2b

9

in-party and out-party. For example, a Democrat who rated the Democrats at 80 and
Republicans at 40 would receive a score of 40 (80-40); a Republican who rated Republicans
at 60 and Democrats at 10 would receive a score of 50.

4.1

Measuring Party Status and Electoral Competition

To generate my primary independent variable, party status, I begin with a measure of
respondent partisanship. Partisanship was measured using the standard 7-point scale. True
independents were removed from the sample due to a lack of partisan affiliation, however
leaning independents were left in the sample in order to maximize the sample size in each
year.4 Furthermore, evidence shows that leaning independents act similarly to partisans in
terms of political attitudes (Klar & Krupnikov, 2016; Keith et al., 1992). While more recent
scholarship on leaning independents has demonstrated that their motivations for identifying
as such are different and can cause certain attitudes to be manifested differently (Klar &
Krupnikov, 2016), I am not aware of any evidence that this difference impacts affective
polarization or the manifestation of out-party animosity.
To approximate state-level partisanship, I use presidential election results.5 Presidential
vote choice has been shown to be an accurate approximation of partisan identity, due to
the strong correlation between the two (Dinas, 2014). For the sake of congruence, I used
election results from the same year that the survey was administered for my proxy measure
of state-level partisanship.
Respondents were matched to the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate’s
vote total to measure their in-party and out-party percentages in their state based on their
placement on the 7-point PID scale. In-party and out-party partisan distributions were then
used to determine the party status of the respondent’s party. The party status variable was
4

The final sample size for each year is 1934, 4904, and 3324 in 2008, 2012, and 2016 respectively.
Using the state level distribution rather than the federal level distribution to determine party status
was due to the state’s closer proximity to the individual. Future iterations of this project may attempt to
utilize restricted data to generate a measure of a respondent’s county or district partisanship. Party status,
as theorized here, is based on how many people an individual believes there are in their in-group; it extends
beyond just winning elections (Huddy, 2001).
5
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coded as 0 if the individual was in the minority party (the number of in-party members
in their state are less than the number of out-party members), and 1 if they were in the
majority party (the number of in-party members in their state are greater than the number
of out-party members). For example, an individual from Mississippi in 2016 would be coded
a 0 if they are a Democrat and a 1 if they are a Republican, while an individual from New
York in 2016 would be a 1 if they are a Democrat and a 0 if they are a Republican. In 2008
and 2012, a Democrat in Pennsylvania would be coded as 1, being in the majority party,
while in 2016 they would be marked as a 0 for being in the minority party. The inverse is
true of a Republican in Pennsylvania, with Pennsylvania Republicans being marked in the
minority party in 2008 and 2012, and then in the majority party in 2016.
Competition is being utilized in order to analyze how the tangibility of the threat the
minority party poses can influence affective polarization and out-party affect. The most
common cutpoint for an election to be considered competitive is a 10 percentage point
difference (i.e., 55-45%) between the two parties (Jacobson, 1987). I utilize this measure
here, with states that saw a less than 10 percentage point difference between the candidates’s
votes share coded as 1, and every other case coded as 0.

4.2

Measuring other Covariates

I contend that the association between party status and both out-party animosity and
affective polarization will exist independently of other known causes of out-party animosity,
such as ideological strength and partisan strength — other work attempting to find the causes
of out-party animosity finds that ideological strength and strength of party identity are
consistently root causes, regardless of context (Webster, 2018). Nevertheless, I must account
for these identities and other factors that may be associated with out-party animosity and
affective polarization
Strength of identity has been shown to be a contributing factor for out-party attitudes
and affective polarization (Mason, 2015). In order to account for this, partisan strength and
11

ideological strength were included in the models. Strength of partisanship was coded from
1-3, with 1 representing leaning party attachment and 3 being a strong partisan attachment.
Since I do not include true independents, there is no category for them in this measure. As
for ideological strength, this was coded from 0-4, with 0 representing self-identified moderates
and 4 representing strong conservatives or liberals.
The demographic control variables included in my final analysis were education, race,
gender, and age. Gender is coded 0 if the respondent is male and 1 if the respondent
is female. Responses other than male or female were changed to NAs to keep responses
consistent from year to year. Age ranges from 18 to 90 in 2016 and 17 to 90 in 2012 and
2008. In all three years 90 represents 90 and all ages above 90, although this represents very
few respondents from the total sample.
Race and education were each recoded to conform to a single scale due to inconsistencies
in the ANES from year to year. These variables were both treated as categorical variables.
The race variable is primarily based on the 2008 scale, however it incorporates self-identification
as Hispanic or non-Hispanic, which was not included in a single measure in 2008. The
final scale was “White, non-Hispanic (1),” “Black, non-Hispanic (2)”, “Other, non-Hispanic,
including multiple (3),” and “Hispanic (4)”. In the analysis below, the reference category
for this variable was White, non-hispanic. Education was coded to the 2012 scale, which
marked individuals for having less than a high school credential (1), a high school credential
(2), some post-high-school education without a Bachelor’s degree (3), a Bachelor’s degree
(4), and a Graduate degree (5). The reference category in the analyses presented below is
having no high school credential.

12
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Results
To test my hypotheses, I first report the average levels of affective polarization

and out-party affect in each year by party (majority/minority) status. I analyze
if there is a statistically significant difference between the average level of affective
polarization and average out-party affect for those in the majority and those in the
minority using a two sample t-test for each year. I then look at the average levels
of affective polarization and out-party affect broken down by both party status and
electoral competition.
Following this descriptive analysis, I estimate an OLS regression model for each
year. In these models, standard errors are clustered by state in order to account for
variation within the states and DC. For 2008 there are only 34 clusters, this is due
to some states not being sampled that year. The fourth model estimated for each
of my dependent variables pools the data and uses yearly fixed effects. Following
these OLS models, in order to best interpret the interaction between party status
and competition, I present the marginal effect of party status based on competition
from each model.

5.1

Party Status and Affective Polarization

Figure 1 shows the average levels of affective polarization in each year for those in
the majority and minority parties. In 2008, the average level of affective polarization
was 40.97 (standard error = .97) for those in the majority party and 34.36 (1.09) for
those in the minority party. Using a t-test, I find that this 6.61 difference is

13

statistically significant at p< .01. In the remaining years, the difference between the two
groups is not as stark. In 2012, the average affective polarization for respondents was 45.60
(.60) and 42.08 (.69) for those in the majority party and the minority party, respectively.
This difference, while less substantial at 3.52, is statistically significant at p<.01. In 2016,
the average affective polarization was 41.6 (.74) for those in the majority party and 40.39
(.83) for those in the minority party. This difference, while in line with my hypothesis, is
not substantial and does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p=.28).
Figure 1: Average Affective Polarization by Party Status

Figure 2 shows the average out-party rating in each year for those in the majority party
and minority party. In 2008, the average out-party rating for those in the majority party
was 33.25 (.68), while the average out-party rating for those in the minority party was 37.61
(.77). Using a t-test, I find that this difference of 4.36 is statistically significant at p<.01.
14

For 2012, the average out-party rating for those in the majority party was 26.29 (.41), while
those in the minority party averaged a 28.23 (.46) out-party rating. Using a t-test, I again
find that the difference between these two averages is also statistically significant at p<.01;
however, it is noticeably smaller than the difference from 2008 at just 1.94. Lastly, for 2016,
the average out-party rating was 24.14 (.49) for those in the majority party and 28.23 (.59)
for those in the minority party. As with the previous two years, I utilize a t-test and find
that this difference is statistically significant at p<.01. This difference of 4.09 is greater than
the difference in 2012, and is more similar to the results from 2008.
Figure 2: Average Out-Party Feeling by Party Status

The averages for in-party affect are also reported in Figure A1. For 2008 and 2012, the
relationship is the exact opposite of the out-party affect models, although in 2012 the size of
this association is even smaller than that of party status and out-party affect. On average,
15

majority party status is associated with an increase of 2.891 (p<.01) and 1.790 (p<.01)
in 2008 and 2012, respectively. 2016 saw a statistically significant difference between the
majority and minority party, however, this relationship was the opposite of the differences
seen in 2008 and 2012, with the majority party having significantly lower in-party affect.
These descriptive statistics provide some support for both H1 and H1a. The association
between affective polarization and party status is not found in every year, but this could be
due to any number of oddities that took place during the 2016 election. Descriptively, this
association does exist and is statistically significant; however, outside of 2008 the difference
is relatively small. Out-party affect’s association with party status is statistically significant
in every year studied. As with affective polarization, however, this difference is relatively
small. 2008 and 2016 saw differences greater than 4, while in 2012 the difference was just
1.94. While the difference seen in 2016 is more than double that of the difference in 2012,
neither is particularly large, as feeling thermometers are scaled from 0-100.

5.2

Party Status, Affective Polarization, and Electoral Competition

Figure 3 shows the average levels of affective polarization broken down by both party
status and electoral competition. While there is still a statistically significant difference
between those in the majority party and minority party, there is little difference based
on competition. In 2008, those in the majority party averaged 40.53 (1.071) for affective
polarization in states that were not competitive, and 43.03 (2.299) in states that were
competitive.

For the minority party, those in competitive states averaged an affective

polarization of 34.9 (2.406) and 31.17 (1.206) in states that are not competitive. These
differences are consistent with H2a (that the majority party will be more affectively polarized
in more competitive states), although there are differences based on party status in both
competitive and not competitive settings. In a competitive context, the difference between
those in the majority and minority parties is 11.86, which is substantially larger than the
difference of 5.63 between those in the majority and minority parties in a not competitive
16

Figure 3: Average Affective Polarization by Party Status and Competition

context.
In 2012, the results support H1 again, however neither H2a or H2b have substantial
support. Those in the majority party on average reported affective polarization scores of
45.16 (.643) in contexts that are not competitive and 47.96 (1.555) in a competitive setting.
For the minority party, the average affective polarization is 41.59 (.762) in a setting that
is not competitive and 44.23 (1.595) in a setting that is competitive. The difference in
affective polarization between those in the majority and minority parties is just 3.57 in not
competitive contexts and 3.73 in competitive contexts. Unlike 2008, this difference is not
substantial.
2016 presents the strongest case for H2b (that the majority party will be more affectively
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polarized in less competitive states), and the introduction of competition does explain some
of the oddities seen in the descriptive statistics for affective polarization based exclusively
on party status in 2016. For the majority party, the average affective polarization rating was
43.41 (.839) when there was no competition, and 41.63 (1.440) when there was. Individuals in
the minority party, however, on average reported 36.66 (1.040) in affective polarization when
there is not competition and 42.65 (1.487) when there is. The difference of 6.75 between
the majority and minority party without competition is statistically significant (p<.01),
while the difference between the two parties was not statistically significant in a competitive
setting.
These descriptive statistics do not provide clear support for either H2a or H2b. While
the substantially greater difference between those in the majority and minority parties in
a competitive setting in 2008 would show support for H2a, no other year has quite as
substantial a difference. 2016 provides some support for H2b as the not competitive setting
shows a larger gap between the majority party and minority party, and it is in a direction
consistent with H2b. The statistics from 2012 provide no support for either hypothesis.
The descriptive statistics for out-party affect, however, provide support for H2b. Figure
4 shows the average out-party feeling thermometer ratings broken down by both party
status and electoral competition. As Figure 4 shows, there is only a statistically significant
difference in average out-party ratings based on party status when there is competition
present. Starting in 2008, when there is no competition, the average out-party rating is
33.18 (.799) for the majority party and 37.66 (.853) for the minority. In areas where there
is competition, those in the majority party averaged a 33.54 (1.551) out-party feeling rating
while the minority party averaged 37.30 (1.711). The difference between average out-party
ratings when there is no competition is a statistically significant 4.48 (p< .01), while the
presence of competition reduces this difference down to 3.76. This does provide some support
for H2b as the only statistically significant difference is seen in not-competitive contexts.
However, the difference-in-differences (4.48 – 3.76) is not all that substantively meaningful.

18

Figure 4: Average Out-Party Feeling by Party Status and Competition

The descriptive statistics for 2012 show more of the same. When there is no competition,
those in the majority party reported an average out-party affect of 26.41 (.443), and those
in the minority party reported an average out-party affect of 28.45 (.513). This difference is
again statistically significant (p<.05). However it is not very substantively meaningful, as
the majority party only shows an average out-party affect that is 2.04 less than those in the
minority. When there is competition, this difference is consistent with H2a, however it is not
statistically significant. Those in the majority party reported an average out-party affect of
25.65 (1.003), and the minority party has an average of 27.22 (1.054). This difference of 1.57
is both substantively and statistically insignificant.
In 2016, both in competitive and not competitive contexts, the difference between the
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majority and minority party is statistically significant, however, in a not competitive context
this difference is slightly greater. In a not competitive context, those in the majority party
reported an average out-party affect of 24.27 (.567), and the minority party had an average
out-party affect of 28.6 (.699). This difference of 4.33 is statistically significant (p<.01), and
is larger than the difference seen in 2012. For competitive contexts, those in the majority
part averaged 23.74 (.952) in out-party affect, while those in the minority averaged 27.43
(1.001) out-party affect. This 3.69 difference is statistically significant (p<.05), although it
is marginally smaller than the difference seen in a not competitive setting, which suggests
support for H2b.
These descriptive statistics for out-party affect provide some support for H2b, as the
largest differences in out-party affect in each year came from contexts which were not
competitive. Only in 2016 was there a statistically significant difference in out-party affect,
however this difference was smaller than in the not competitive setting from the same year.
These descriptive results are more consistent than those for affective polarization. A closer
look at in-party affect may provide insight into this inconsistency.
Figure A2 shows the average in-party affect by both party status and electoral competition
in each year. In most cases these differences are statistically significant and less than 2.5,
with two exceptions. In competitive settings in 2008, the majority party averaged an in-party
feeling of 76.56 (1.309) and the minority party had an average in-party feeling of 68.48
(1.664). This difference of 8.08 is both statistically significant (p<.01) and substantial. The
second oddity is in 2016, where in competitive settings, the majority party had a lower level
of in-party affect (65.37 (.981)) than the minority party (70.08 (.952)). This statistically
significant difference (p<.01) is relatively substantial at 4.71, which is nearly double the
difference in the same year when elections were not competitive. These results are overall
inconsistent and do not paint a clear relationship between in-party affect and party status
or competition.
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5.3

Regression Results

Table 1 shows the results of 4 OLS models with affective polarization as the dependent
variable. All standard errors are clustered by state.6 As expected, strength of partisanship
and strength of ideology have a significant association with affective polarization. This
association is present in each year. The full model shows that on average, increasing an
individual’s partisan strength by 1 is associated with an increase of 15.04 in the difference
between that respondent’s in-party and out-party feeling thermometer ratings. In other
words, a respondent who identifies as a strong partisan on average has an affective polarization
rating that is approximately 30 times greater than an individual who identifies as a leaning
partisan in any given year.
For the main independent variables of interest, in general, majority party status is shown
to have a weak association with affective polarization when there is no competition in an
election.7 The strongest association is in 2008, however this is not statistically significant.
In 2012, an individual who is in a not competitive state and in the majority party is
associated with on average being 3.39 points more affectively polarized than individuals
in not competitive states and in the minority party.
The interaction term is inconsistent across models and statistically insignificant. In
order to better understand these results, Figure 5 shows the average marginal effect of party
status by level of competition from each model. As shown in Figure 5, in 2008, there is
a statistically significant association between party status and affective polarization when
there is a competitive election (p<.01). While this difference of 12.4 between those in the
majority and minority party is the most substantial, it is the only significant association
which occurs in a competitive context.
In the remaining three models, the only statistically significant average marginal effects
occur when there is no competition in a given state. In 2012, the average marginal effect of
6

2008 only has 34 clusters due to some states being missing from the sample.
Differences in significance from descriptive statistics due to different methods in calculating standard
errors.
7
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Table 1: Party Status, Competition, and Affective Polarization (ANES 2008, 2012, 2016)
2008
2012
2016
Full
∗
∗
Majority Party (0,1)
5.65
3.39
4.74
4.28∗
(4.22)
(1.39)
(1.88)
(1.78)
Competition (0,1)
−4.65
1.60
4.91
2.44
(3.58)
(3.43)
(2.53)
(1.74)
Majority Party*Competiton
6.74
0.33
−5.28
−1.24
(5.49)
(5.15)
(3.29)
(2.75)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
PID Strength (1-3)
16.56
14.84
14.46
15.04∗∗∗
(0.98)
(0.61)
(0.56)
(0.51)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
Ideology Strength (0-3)
2.86
5.88
5.96
5.30∗∗∗
(0.66)
(0.61)
(0.50)
(0.43)
Education (base: no high school)
High School Credential
3.18
−1.42
2.93
0.97
(2.50)
(1.51)
(2.22)
(1.22)
Some post-high-school, no bachelor‘s degree
1.27
−0.90
3.99∗
1.29
(3.01)
(1.54)
(1.88)
(1.29)
Bachelor‘s degree
1.21
−2.23
1.18
−0.46
(3.27)
(1.48)
(2.13)
(1.49)
Graduate Degree
2.45
−1.03
2.06
0.69
(3.37)
(1.78)
(2.23)
(1.56)
Race (base: white, non-hispanic):
Black, non-hispanic
6.22∗
13.50∗∗∗ 11.89∗∗∗ 11.82∗∗∗
(2.30)
(1.51)
(2.08)
(1.07)
Other, non-hispanic, including multiple
−1.89
0.12
0.74
0.14
(2.90)
(1.88)
(2.25)
(1.25)
Hispanic
−2.29
2.77∗
1.78
1.55∗
(1.81)
(1.20)
(1.62)
(0.73)
Female (0,1)
−0.17
0.49
1.36
0.73
(1.15)
(0.99)
(0.86)
(0.61)
Age
−0.06
0.02
0.06∗
0.02
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.01)
2012
4.65∗∗∗
(0.99)
2016
2.63∗
(1.09)
∗∗
Constant
−2.82
0.16
−8.27
−6.39∗∗∗
(4.01)
(1.81)
(2.76)
(1.36)
2
R
0.24
0.25
0.23
0.24
2
Adj. R
0.23
0.25
0.23
0.24
Num. obs.
1934
4904
3324
10162
N Clusters
34
51
51
51
∗∗∗ p

< 0.001;

∗∗ p

< 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05
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Figure 5: Average Marginal Effect of Party Status on Affective Polarization, by Competition

party status when there is no competition is 3.39 (p<.05). In 2016, this average marginal
effect is 4.74 (p<.05), which shows that in 2016, in a state in which there was no competition,
the average difference in affective polarization between those in the majority and minority
parties is 4.74, with individuals in the majority party displaying higher levels of affective
polarization. Interestingly, the average marginal effect of party status in 2016 when there is
competition is -.539, which is counter to all my hypotheses; however, this average marginal
effect is not statistically significant. The full model shows that on average, in any given
year, when there is a state with no competition, the majority party is associated with a 4.28
greater difference in feeling thermometer ratings between their in- and out-parties. While
these results are somewhat mixed, the majority of the evidence supports H2b. While this
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evidence does support H2b, it is clear that the association between affective polarization and
party status is not substantial, although it is statistically significant and present in three out
of the four models presented.
Table 2 shows the results of four OLS models with out-party affect as the dependent
variable. As with affective polarization, strength of partisanship and strength of ideology
both have substantial and statistically significant associations with out-party affect. In 2008,
partisan strength is associated with a decrease of 7.57 (p<.001) for each change in strength.
An individual in 2008 who identified as a strong partisan will on average have on average
15.14 lower out-party affect than those who identified as leaning independents. The full
model shows that in any given year in the sample, the difference in out-party affect between
a leaning independent and a strong partisan is on average 11.16 (p<.001).
The association between party status and out-party affect is statistically significant when
there is no competition, as shown by the majority party coefficients in Table 2. These
results are similar to those found in Table 1 for affective polarization. To better understand
the association between party status and out-party affect, however, Figure 6 shows the
average marginal effects of party status based on levels of competition. As with affective
polarization, the only significant average marginal effect in the 2008 model is when a state
was competitive, with an average marginal effect of -5.44 (p<.001). When a state is not
competitive, the average marginal effect of party status is -4.08, however this does not reach
traditional standards of statistical significance (p=.127).
For the 2012 model, the average marginal effect of party status when there is no competition
is -1.95 (p<.05). This shows that when an individual is in a competitive state, those in the
majority party are associated with having a decreased outparty affect by nearly 2 points on
the feeling thermometer scale. While this effect is statistically significant, as with the other
findings it is not that substantial. The average marginal effect of party status when there is
competition is -2.70, although this marginal effect is not statistically significant (p=.315).
The average marginal effect of party status in the 2016 model was -2.56 when the state
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Table 2: Party Status, Competition, and Out-Party Affect (ANES 2008, 2012, 2016)

Majority Party (0,1)
Competition (0,1)
Majority Party*Competition
PID Strength (1-3)
Ideology Strength (0-3)
Education (base: no high school)
High School Credential
Some post-high-school, no bachelor‘s degree
Bachelor‘s degree
Graduate Degree
Race (base: white, non-hispanic):
Black, non-hispanic
Other, non-hispanic, including multiple
Hispanic
Female (0,1)
Age

2008
−4.08
(2.67)
1.80
(2.11)
−1.36
(3.30)
−7.57∗∗∗
(0.54)
−1.69∗∗
(0.53)

2012
−1.95∗
(0.77)
−0.32
(1.53)
−0.75
(2.81)
−5.48∗∗∗
(0.45)
−4.74∗∗∗
(0.42)

2016
−2.56∗∗
(0.73)
−1.01
(1.65)
0.09
(2.04)
−4.51∗∗∗
(0.41)
−5.48∗∗∗
(0.39)

Full
−2.60∗∗
(0.78)
−0.39
(0.69)
−0.51
(1.29)
−5.58∗∗∗
(0.35)
−4.39∗∗∗
(0.34)

−3.26
(2.05)
−2.48
(2.50)
−5.26
(2.66)
−7.37∗
(3.33)

0.61
(0.96)
−0.29
(1.17)
−1.34
(1.21)
−3.61∗∗
(1.29)

−3.35∗
(1.54)
−4.27∗∗
(1.53)
−3.96∗∗
(1.33)
−4.74∗∗
(1.64)

−1.53
(0.84)
−2.26∗
(1.09)
−3.03∗
(1.15)
−4.70∗∗∗
(1.06)

0.79
(1.91)
2.31
(1.93)
6.75∗∗∗
(1.44)
2.97∗∗
(0.83)
0.08∗∗
(0.03)

−3.13∗∗
(1.13)
0.53
(1.53)
3.11∗∗
(0.97)
1.69∗
(0.79)
0.00
(0.02)

−2.65
(1.75)
2.35
(2.06)
2.24
(1.20)
1.17∗
(0.52)
−0.05∗
(0.02)

51.13∗∗∗
(2.84)
0.13
0.12
1934
34

45.20∗∗∗
(1.50)
0.13
0.13
4904
51

49.38∗∗∗
(1.96)
0.14
0.13
3324
51

−2.36∗∗
(0.84)
1.49
(1.29)
3.63∗∗∗
(0.82)
1.78∗∗∗
(0.47)
−0.00
(0.01)
−6.35∗∗∗
(0.76)
−7.16∗∗∗
(0.78)
53.34∗∗∗
(1.23)
0.15
0.14
10162
51

2012
2016
Constant
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
N Clusters
∗∗∗ p

< 0.001;

∗∗ p

< 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05
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Figure 6: Average Marginal Effect of Party Status on Out-Party Affect, by Competition

was not competitive. When the state was competitive, this average marginal effect was
decreased to -2.47, and this effect was not statistically significant (p=.195). In short, the
previous two models provide some support for H2b, while the model for 2008 mainly supports
H2a.
That said, the full model shows that the average marginal effect of party status does
not change based on levels of competition. Regardless of competition, the average marginal
effect of party status in the full model is -2.70 (p<.001). In any given year, the majority
party is associated with nearly 3 feeling thermometer points of lower out-party affect than
those in the minority regardless of how competitive the state is. A difference of 2.70 is not
substantial, however it is statistically significant in both contexts. This evidence suggests
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that collectively across all three elections neither H2a or H2b are supported, however this
does provide support for H1a — that those in the majority party will have lower out-party
affect than those in the minority party.
Table A1 shows the results of four OLS models estimated with In-party affect as the
dependent variable. Again, strength of partisanship and strength of ideology have the
strongest association with in-party affect as they do with both out-party affect and affective
polarization. Unlike the previous two variables, however, there is no real clear relationship
that can be discerned between party status and in-party affect. None of the coefficients for
majority party status are statistically significant.
Figure A3 shows the average marginal effects of party status by competition. In competitive
states in 2008 did party status have a significant association with in-party affect with an
average marginal effect of 6.95 (p<.01). In 2012, however, there was a significant association
between party status and in-party affect only when there was no competition (p<.1). This
average marginal effect of 1.44 is not substantial in the slightest. Conversely, the average
marginal effects in 2016 show that there is a significant association between party status and
in-party affect as well when competition is present (p=.059), however this average marginal
effect is in the opposite direction from the 2008 model at -3.01. The results of these average
marginal effects show that there is no clear relationship between party status and in-party
affect.
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6

Discussion and Conclusion
Overall, the association between party status and both affective polarization

and out-party affect does not eclipse the effect of either strength of partisanship
or strength of ideology in any model. As shown in past literature, strength of
partisanship and ideology are the strongest influences on affective polarization and
out-party affect (Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). That
said, the association between party status and out-party affect does still remain
statistically significant despite the inclusion of these strong predictors of out-party
affect.
Understanding the causes of affective polarization is an essential question for
political science. Previous work has shown that an individual’s attachment to certain
groups such as partisan groups or ideological groups has a direct effect on out-party
affect (Mason, 2015; Iyengar & Krupenkin, 2018; Abramowitz & Webster, 2016).
Social identity theory has shown that social groups can be treated similarly to sports
teams, and that there is a desire to advance the status of one’s group (Huddy, Mason,
& Aarøe, 2015; Huddy, 2001). An aspect of this relationship that past literature has
left out is whether or not an individual’s “team” is winning or losing in their home
state. The desire to advance a groups’ status has been discussed previously, but how
that group already having status impacts its view of the “other” has not been tested
at length.
In this paper, I hypothesize that individuals who are in the majority have higher
levels of affective polarization and lower levels of out-party affect. Both descriptively
and through statistical analysis, I find support for my hypotheses. Although this
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association is not greater than the association between affective polarization and both
ideology strength and strength of partisanship, it still maintains significance in the majority
of the models presented with these covariates. While the strength, or lack thereof, of this
association is potentially problematic, it is possibly due to the use of observational data,
and the majority status variable only being an approximation utilizing electoral returns to
estimate partisan distribution. A more accurate measure of partisan distribution at the
state or some lower level could potentially yield a stronger association between status and
out-party affect. This analysis has demonstrated that there exists at least some relationship
between the status of a party and out-party affect.
The association between affective polarization and party status is potentially due to
valence loss aversion, however the data presented here does cast doubt on that connection.
With competition being used as a proxy for loss aversion, or more specifically a threat which
would activate loss aversion, there was little difference in the average marginal effect of party
status based on competition. The results for affective polarization do show some support for
H2b, that in less competitive settings the majority party will be more affectively polarized as
they have more to lose, however this evidence is still weak at best. The association between
party status could be unrelated to loss aversion, instead being an artifact of partisan sorting.
Other literature shows that increased sorting causes a decrease in cross cutting cleavages and
an increase in affective polarization (Levendusky, 2009). If an individual is in the majority
party, then they are likely not exposed to as many opposing beliefs, while those in the
minority party are likely constantly confronted with the opinions of those who disagree with
them.
One potential cause for the weak association between party status and affective polarization
could be due to the use of observational data to test this relationship. Further research could
attempt to isolate causality through manipulation of perceptions of partisan distribution in
an experimental setting. This research has not considered an individual’s perception of
their state’s partisan distribution, rather using a measure that likely reflects the objective
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partisan distribution at the time the survey was administered. Intentionally manipulating
these perceptions would allow for a more direct means for analyzing the relationship between
perceptions of partisan distribution and affective polarization. This work could also include
a direct measure of loss aversiveness in order to determine the role that loss aversion plays
in the relationship between party status and affective polarization.
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One potential cause for the weak association between party status and affective polarization
could be due to the use of observational data to test this relationship.
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Figure A1: Average In-Party Feeling by Party Status

Figure A2: Average In-party Feeling by Party Status and Competition
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Figure A3: Average Marginal Effect of Party Status on In-Party Affect, by Competition
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Table A1: Party Status, Competition, and In-Party Affect (ANES
2008
2012
Majority Party (0,1)
1.58
1.44
(1.80)
(0.86)
Competition (0,1)
−2.85
1.29
(1.74)
(2.05)
Majority Party * Competition
5.38∗
−0.43
(2.51)
(2.54)
PID Strength (1-3)
9.00∗∗∗
9.36∗∗∗
(0.53)
(0.37)
∗
Ideology Strength (0-3)
1.17
1.14∗∗∗
(0.49)
(0.32)
Education (base: no high school)
High School Credential
−0.08
−0.81
(1.27)
(1.05)
Some post-high-school, no bachelor‘s degree −1.21
−1.19
(1.82)
(1.05)
∗∗
Bachelor‘s degree
−4.05
−3.57∗∗∗
(1.41)
(0.98)
∗∗
Graduate Degree
−4.92
−4.65∗∗∗
(1.48)
(1.11)
Race (base: white, non-hispanic):
Black, non-hispanic
7.01∗∗∗ 10.37∗∗∗
(1.20)
(0.72)
Other, non-hispanic, including multiple
0.42
0.65
(2.32)
(1.13)
Hispanic
4.46∗∗∗
5.88∗∗∗
(0.70)
(0.59)
∗∗∗
Female (0,1)
2.80
2.18∗∗∗
(0.64)
(0.46)
Age
0.02
0.02
(0.02)
(0.02)
2012

2008, 2012, 2016)
2016
Full
2.18
1.69
(1.68)
(1.14)
3.89∗
2.04
(1.53)
(1.25)
−5.18∗
−1.75
(2.33)
(1.77)
9.95∗∗∗
9.47∗∗∗
(0.49)
(0.28)
0.48
0.91∗∗∗
(0.33)
(0.21)
−0.42
(1.53)
−0.28
(1.20)
−2.78
(1.66)
−2.67
(1.53)

−0.56
(0.69)
−0.97
(0.65)
−3.48∗∗∗
(0.63)
−4.02∗∗∗
(0.83)

9.24∗∗∗
(1.08)
3.08∗
(1.36)
4.02∗
(1.65)
2.53∗∗∗
(0.66)
0.01
(0.02)

9.45∗∗∗
(0.58)
1.62
(0.84)
5.18∗∗∗
(0.50)
2.51∗∗∗
(0.31)
0.01
(0.01)
−1.70∗∗
(0.63)
−4.53∗∗∗
(0.78)
46.95∗∗∗
(1.37)
0.24
0.23
10162
51

2016
48.31∗∗∗
(1.92)
0.23
0.22
1934
34

Constant
R2
Adj. R2
Num. obs.
N Clusters
∗∗∗ p

< 0.001;

∗∗ p

< 0.01; ∗ p < 0.05

40

45.36∗∗∗
(1.31)
0.25
0.25
4904
51

41.10∗∗∗
(2.28)
0.20
0.19
3324
51
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